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Ortiz-Tulla: Qualified Does Not Mean Over Qualified

QUALIFIED DOES NOT MEAN OVER-QUALIFIED: THE ADA’S
ACCOMMODATION OF LAST RESORT SHOULD NOT BE A
COMPETITION!
Dana Ortiz-Tulla*
“It’s not our disabilities, it’s our abilities that count.” 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Laws are enacted for the betterment of society as a whole.2
One such law is the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 3
Congress states in the ADA that its purpose is “to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.” 4
Additionally, Congress
expresses the need “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.”5 The ADA “ensures that the Federal Government plays
a central role in enforcing the standards established . . . on behalf of
individuals with disabilities.”6 The federal circuit courts have fallen
short of fulfilling the ADA’s purpose in relation to reassignment as a

* J.D. Candidate 2023, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S.
Criminal Justice, St. John’s University – Staten Island. I would like to thank
Professor Michelle Zakarin and the Law Review staff for their guidance and
support throughout this process. I would also like to thank my parents Dorothy and
Steven who set me on this path of infinite possibilities. Lastly, I would like to
thank my fiancé Wess who has been by my side through it all.
1
Quotes and a Story, PEARL BUCK CTR., https://pearlbuckcenter.com/quotes-and-astory-on-dis-ability (last visited Mar. 29, 2021) (quoting Chris Burke).
2
See Tom Head, Why We Need Laws to Exist in Society, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 16,
2021), https://www.thoughtco.com/why-laws-exist-721458 (discussing the reasons
why laws exist).
3
42 U.S.C. § 12101.
4
§ 12101 (b)(1).
5
§ 12101(b)(2).
6
§ 12101(b)(3).
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reasonable accommodation. 7 This Note will discuss the need for an
unequivocal resolution as to whether an employee with a disability,
seeking reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable
accommodation, is forced to compete for the position or whether
reassignment is mandatory.
The lack of direction from the Supreme Court has caused a
noticeable divide throughout the circuit courts which has led to the
unequal treatment of disabled employees. Currently, the Fifth,8
Eighth,9 and Eleventh10 Circuits do not require mandatory
reassignment to a vacant position without competition. Conversely,
the Seventh,11 Tenth,12 and D.C. Circuits13 hold that reassignment to
a vacant position is mandatory even in the face of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory hiring policy seeking the most qualified applicant.
The Fourth Circuit14 has recently decided that reassignment in
violation of Lowe’s merit-based advancement system would not be
reasonable.15
Part II of this Note will review the ADA, including
background, definitions, legislative intent, and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) guidance. Part III of this Note
will discuss the Supreme Court’s limited guidance. Part IV will
evaluate the Circuit Courts that decided reassignment should require
competition including a recent case from the Fourth Circuit. Part V
of this Note will examine the Circuit Courts that support mandatory
reassignment. Part VI will interpret what qualified means under the
ADA and why employers should not use this as a pretext to
discriminate against disabled employees. Finally, this Note will
consider why reassignment should be mandatory.

7

See infra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
9
Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007).
10
EEOC v. St Joseph’s Hosp. Inc., 842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016).
11
EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012).
12
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
13
Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
14
Elledge v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 979 F.3d 1004 (4th Cir. 2020).
15
Id. at 1016.
8
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AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
A. Background and Legislative Intent

Congress intended that the ADA promote equality for
disabled Americans by assuring them the opportunity to live
independently and with economic self-sufficiency.16 In furtherance
of this goal, the ADA seeks to eliminate discrimination against
disabled individuals.17 Under this statute, a disabled individual is one
whose activities are substantially limited by “a physical or mental
impairment.”18
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against
“a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees . . . and privileges of employment.” 19 A qualified
individual with a disability is one who can accomplish the essential
functions of the job which he or she holds or desires, with or without
an accommodation.20 The term “essential functions” is used to
describe fundamental job tasks. 21 Discrimination under the ADA
includes not providing reasonable accommodations for a qualified
disabled employee’s physical or mental disabilities.22
Instead of defining “reasonable accommodations,” the ADA
provides a list of examples which may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other

16

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
Id. (b)(1).
18
§12102 (1)(A); see also id. (2) (describing major life activities).
19
§ 12112(a).
20
§ 12111(8).
21
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
337.
22
§ 12112(b)(5)(A).
17
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similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.23
Under the ADA discrimination may also include denying a
disabled qualified employee access to certain opportunities within the
company, if the denial is based on a reasonable accommodation
request.24 The ADA requires employers to make reasonable
accommodations for disabled employees unless the employer can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose a hardship on the
employer.25 Additionally, the statute defines undue hardship as an
action that is significantly difficult to accomplish or a considerable
expense.26
The ADA requires employers to make reasonable
accommodations in order to erase barriers created by a disability. 27
This legislation instructs employers to make decisions based on an
individual employee’s qualifications, and not on “presumptions as to
what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot do.” 28
Employers are compelled to reasonably accommodate applicants or
employees who are “otherwise qualified” for a job.29 The term
“otherwise qualified” is used to describe a disabled person who meets
all the criteria for a job, except the criteria that cannot be met due to
his or her disability, but may be met if a reasonable accommodation
is given.30

23

§ 12111(9).
§ 12112 (b)(5)(B).
25
Id. (b)(5)(A).
26
§ 12111 (10)(A); id. (B) (“In determining whether an accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include- (i)
the nature and cost of the accommodation needed; (ii) the overall financial
resources of the facility; (iii) the number of persons employed at such facility; (iv)
the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise on the operation of
the facility; (v) the employer's overall financial resources; and (vi) the type of the
employer's operation.”).
27
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), supra note 21, at 65.
28
Id. at 102.
29
Id. at 64.
30
Id. at 64-65.
24

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/19

4

Ortiz-Tulla: Qualified Does Not Mean Over Qualified

2021 QUALIFIED DOES NOT MEAN OVER-QUALIFIED

1057

B. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Guidance
The EEOC was vested with enforcement and regulatory
authority by the ADA.31 Although the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance
is less than controlling authority, it does “constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.”32
When examining reasonable accommodations, EEOC
regulations are similar to the ADA prohibitions, stating that
employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations unless
there is an undue hardship to the employer.33 Unlike the statute, the
EEOC regulations attempt to provide a more meaningful definition of
reasonable accommodation, stating that a reasonable accommodation
means:
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application
process that enable a qualified applicant with a
disability to be considered for the position such
qualified applicant desires; or (ii) Modifications or
adjustments to the work environment, or the manner
or circumstances under which the position held or
desired is customarily performed, that enable an
individual with a disability who is qualified to perform
the essential functions of that position, or (iii)
Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered
entity’s employee with a disability to enjoy equal
benefits and privileges or employment as are enjoyed
by its other similarly situated employees without
disabilities.34
The EEOC regulations also include a non-exhaustive list of
reasonable accommodations and add guidance to determine
appropriate reasonable accommodations, noting that absent a

31

42 U.S.C. §§ 12116-12117, 12205a.
Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
33
29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (2011).
34
§ 1630.2(o)(1).
32
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hardship, employers are required to provide an accommodation for
qualified disabled employees. 35
Additionally, the EEOC Enforcement Guidance attempts to
clarify the responsibilities of employers and rights of disabled
individuals regarding reasonable accommodation requests.36 The
EEOC’s guidance indicates that reasonable accommodations are a
“fundamental statutory requirement because of the nature of
discrimination faced by individuals with disabilities.” 37 More
specifically, the EEOC guidance elaborates on the accommodation of
reassignment.38 The EEOC guidance states that reassignment as a
reasonable accommodation “must be provided” if an employee can
no longer carry out the essential function of his or her job with or
without an accommodation, unless there is an undue hardship to the
employer.39 The guidance notes that a disabled employee must be
qualified, meaning that he or she must meet the “requisite skill,
experience, education, and other job-related requirements,” and also
be able to “perform the essential function of the new position.”40 The
EEOC guidance makes sure to specifically point out that an employee
“does not need to be the best qualified individual” in order to be
reassigned.41 Additionally, the guidance indicates that reassignment
to a vacant position is the reasonable accommodation of “last
resort.”42 This accommodation is utilized when employees can no
longer carry out the necessary functions of the job they hold. 43 The
transfer of a qualified employee to a vacant position may prevent loss
of employment and allow the employer to keep a valuable worker,
just as legislators intended. 44

35

Id. at (2)-(4).
U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable
Accommodation & Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
NO. 915.002 (2002), 2002 WL 31994335.
37
Id. at 2.
38
See id. at 20-24.
39
Id. at 20.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 20.
43
Id.
44
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), supra note 21, at 63.
36
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SUPREME COURT DECISION

The United States Supreme Court supplied some direction for
disabled employees requesting a reassignment in U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett.45 Robert Barnett worked as a customer service agent for
U.S. Air46 for ten years.47 Barnett suffered a back injury when he
was working as a cargo handler for U.S. Air in 1990.48 Once he
returned to work, Barnett realized he was unable to perform the
physical aspects of his position. 49 Barnett was able to use his
seniority to transfer to a position in the mail room. 50 In 1992, Barnett
learned that “two employees with greater seniority planned to
exercise their seniority right to transfer to the mail room.” 51 This
would eliminate Barnett’s mail room position and limit him to cargo
area jobs.52 Barnett requested he be allowed to remain in the mail
room as an accommodation and was granted this request for five
months while his claim was evaluated. 53 In January of 1993, Barnett
was removed from his position in the mail room and placed on
leave.54 Barnett filed a complaint with the EEOC which determined
that U.S. Air may have committed discrimination when it denied
Barnett’s request for a reasonable accommodation. 55 Barnett sued
and the district court granted summary judgment for U.S. Air.56
Barnett appealed, arguing that a violation of the ADA occurred when
U.S. Air failed to extend his mail room reassignment request. 57 The
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court decision, stating that
45

535 U.S. 391 (2002).
See Ben Mutzabaugh, US Airways’ Final Flight Closes Curtain on Another
Major Airline, USA TODAY (Oct. 15, 2015, 12:33 PM)
https://www.usatoday.com/story/todayinthesky/2015/10/16/us-airways-final-flightamerican-merger/73922874 (discussing the name change of U.S. Air to U.S.
Airways in 1997).
47
Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc. 228 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated
535 U.S. 391 (2002).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1109.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
46

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2021], Art. 19

1060

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

Barnett’s accommodation request was reasonable unless the
employer could prove an undue hardship. 58 The court held that
reassignment, where an employer has a seniority system, requires a
fact intensive analysis.59 The court continued by stating that “[i]f
there is no undue hardship, a disabled employee who seeks
reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, if otherwise qualified
for a position, should receive the position rather than merely have an
opportunity to compete with non-disabled employees.”60
U.S. Airways petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
asking the Court to decide whether the ADA compels an employer
who has an established seniority system to provide a disabled
employee with a reassignment as a reasonable accommodation. 61
The Court summarized the parties’ interpretation of the ADA when a
seniority system is involved. 62 U.S. Airways argued that a violation
of a seniority system would always be unreasonable. 63 Barnett
protested, stating that a violation of a seniority system could never be
a definitive bar to a reasonable accommodation.64 Barnett conceded
that a seniority system violation may show that an accommodation
caused an undue hardship to the employer. 65
The Court began its analysis with U.S. Airways’ antipreference argument.66 U.S. Airways contended that the ADA does
not “require an employer to grant preferential treatment” to disabled
employees seeking reasonable accommodations. 67 Rejecting this
argument, the Court stated that sometimes preferences will be
necessary to achieve the ADA’s equal opportunity goal. 68
Acknowledging that any accommodation can be deemed preferential,
the Court declared that a difference in treatment which may violate a
disability-neutral rule does not, by itself, render an accommodation
unreasonable.69
58

Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1120.
60
Id.
61
U.S. Airways, Inc. v Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 396 (2002).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 397.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
59
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Continuing its analysis, the Court discussed Barnett’s claim
that a reasonable accommodation should only mean that the
accommodation is effective. 70 Barnett attempted to persuade the
Court to only consider the “accommodation’s ability to meet an
individual’s disability-related needs, and nothing more.”71 The Court
rejected this argument explaining how an effective accommodation
may be unreasonable because of its impact on fellow employees.72
The Supreme Court then considered whether a disabled
employee’s request for reassignment as an accommodation would be
reasonable in light of an employer’s seniority system. 73 The Court
held that ordinarily such a request would be unreasonable and
therefore “the seniority system will prevail.” 74 The Court then
proposed a two-step approach which would allow a disabled
employee to show that an ordinarily unreasonable accommodation
request in light of a seniority system was, in fact, reasonable. 75 The
disabled employee would need to show that the accommodation
“seems reasonable on its face.” 76 Once this occurs, the burden shifts
to the employer to demonstrate an undue hardship. 77 If the disabled
employee is unable to show the accommodation is reasonable “in the
run of cases,” the employee may be able to show special
circumstances which would warrant a finding of reasonableness due
to particular facts of the case. 78 Ultimately, the Court held that
ordinarily reassignment is not required under the ADA when it would
violate a seniority system. 79
Unfortunately, no further direction has been given to disabled
employees who are seeking reassignment outside of a seniority
system.80 The lack of guidance has caused a noticeable divide
amongst the United States Courts of Appeals. 81
70

Id. at 399.
Id.
72
Id. at 400.
73
Id. at 402.
74
Id. at 394.
75
Id. at 401.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 401-02.
78
Id. at 405.
79
Id. at 406.
80
United Airlines, Inc. v. EEOC, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (denying certiorari on a
case involving reassignment in the face of a best-qualified hiring system).
81
See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
71
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CIRCUITS THAT HOLD REASSIGNMENT SHOULD NOT BE
MANDATORY
A. Fifth Circuit

In Daugherty v. City of El Paso,82 Carl Daugherty was a parttime bus driver for the city of El Paso.83 While employed, Daugherty
was diagnosed with a form of diabetes which made him insulindependent.84 Once the city was made aware of the diagnosis,
Daugherty was placed on leave without pay and he was eventually
fired.85 Daugherty sued the city, claiming it violated the ADA by not
accommodating his disability. 86 At trial, a jury awarded Daugherty
$5,000 in damages and the city appealed. 87
In this case, the city argued that Daugherty’s diabetes is not
considered a disability under the ADA and therefore he is not a
“qualified individual with a disability.” 88 Daugherty conceded that
he was unable to perform the essential parts of his duties as a bus
driver after his diabetes diagnosis.89 However, Daugherty argued that
he should have been eligible for reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation.90
The Fifth Circuit stated that a qualified person with a
disability is one who can perform the essential duties of a job which
he or she “holds or desires.” 91 The court rejected the city’s position
that “desires” only refers to positions sought by job applicants. 92
Instead, the Fifth Circuit read the statutory language as including
employees who become disabled, since the overall purpose of the
ADA is to prohibit discrimination during hiring, firing, advancement,
and other “privileges of employment.”93

82

56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 696.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 697.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 699 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
92
Id.
93
Id.
83
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The city offered the governing city charter as evidence to
support its employment practices.94 Although employees who were
physically unable to perform their duties were given priority, the city
explained that the process for filling vacancies required positions be
filled by full-time employees before becoming available to part-time
employees.95 The city surmised that if it were to give a vacant fulltime position to Daugherty, it would risk being sued.96
Ultimately, the court held it “[does] not read the ADA as
requiring affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities,
in the sense of requiring that disabled persons be given priority in
hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled.” 97
Additionally, the court stated the ADA “prohibits employment
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities, no more
and no less.”98
B. Eighth Circuit
The Eight Circuit held in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores 99 that an
employer may reject a reasonable accommodation request for
reassignment, if the accommodation would violate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory hiring policy which requires the employer to fill
the position with the most qualified candidate. 100 In this case, Pam
Huber was a grocery order filler for Wal-Mart.101 While working,
Huber permanently injured her right arm which hindered her ability
to perform the essential aspects of her job. 102 Huber requested
reassignment to a vacant router position, which was equivalent in pay
to her current position, but Wal-Mart denied the transfer.103 Instead,
Wal-Mart required Huber to apply for and compete with other
applicants for the position. 104 Even though Huber was qualified for

94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 700.
98
Id.
99
486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007).
100
Id. at 483.
101
Id. at 481.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
95
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the router position, Wal-Mart hired a non-disabled applicant.105 The
parties agreed that although Huber was qualified, she was not the
“most qualified candidate” which is why she was passed over for the
job.106 Wal-Mart eventually reassigned Huber to another facility as a
maintenance associate which paid less than half of her original
wages.107
The court considered whether an employer, as an
accommodation, is required to give an employee preference in
transferring to a position that is vacant, if the employee is not the
most qualified person vying for the position.108 The Eighth Circuit
held that “the ADA is not an affirmative action statute and does not
require an employer to reassign a qualified disabled employee to a
vacant position when such reassignment would violate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory policy of the employer to hire the most qualified
candidate.”109 The court reasoned that Huber was not discriminated
against when Wal-Mart chose an applicant who had superior
qualifications.110 Ultimately, the court held that Huber “was treated
exactly as all other candidates were treated for the Wal-Mart job
opening, no worse and no better.”111
C.

Eleventh Circuit

In EEOC v. St Joseph’s Hospital Inc.,112 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals decided that an employer was not required to
reassign a disabled employee without competition, nor was it
required to give a disabled employee preferential treatment. 113 In this
case, Leokadia Bryk was working in the psychiatric ward of St.
Joseph’s Hospital as a nurse for approximately twenty-one years.114
In 2002, she was diagnosed with spinal stenosis which caused her to
experience back pain. 115 Bryk underwent hip surgery in 2009.116
105

Id.
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 482.
109
Id. at 483 (footnote omitted).
110
Id. at 484.
111
Id.
112
842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016).
113
Id. at 1345.
114
Id. at 1337.
115
Id. at 1338.
106
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After the surgery, she depended on a cane for support and to alleviate
back pain.117 Bryk continued to work in the hospital’s psychiatric
ward with her cane until 2011, when she was demoted from Charge
Nurse to Clinical Nurse II for violating procedures.118 During the
disciplinary action, the hospital became concerned that patients could
use Bryk’s cane as a weapon. 119 Bryk was given thirty days to find
and apply for another position if she wanted to remain employed. 120
However, Bryk was required to compete with other applicants for any
position for which she applied. 121 Although she applied for seven
positions, she did not qualify for any position.122 Bryk freely
admitted that certain medical or surgical positions would not be
appropriate because she had only worked in psychiatric or drug
dependency units for the last twenty-one years.123
The Eleventh Circuit began by analyzing whether Bryk was
“disabled” under the ADA, and determined, that her physical
impairment was limiting enough to deem her disabled.124 The court
also analyzed whether Bryk was a “qualified individual.” 125 The
ADA defines a “qualified individual” as one who can perform the
duties of the position he or she holds or desires.126 Using this
definition, the court found that Bryk was qualified. 127 Once the court
determined Bryk was a qualified disabled employee, it analyzed
whether the ADA requires reassignment to a vacant position without
competition.128
The court concluded that “the ADA does not require
reassignment without competition for, or preferential treatment of,
the disabled.”129 The Eleventh Circuit reached this conclusion by
suggesting that the use of the word “may,” when referring to
116

Id.
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1344.
125
Id.
126
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
127
St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1344.
128
Id. at 1345.
129
Id.
117
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reassignment as a possible reasonable accommodation, means that
reassignment should not be mandatory. 130 Continuing its analysis,
the court used the framework in Barnett131 to examine whether
reassignment should be mandatory.132 The Eleventh Circuit decided
that reassignment is not reasonable if it violates an employer’s “bestqualified hiring or transfer policy.”133 The court rationalized this
decision by stating that “[p]assing over the best-qualified job
applicants in favor of less-qualified ones is not [] reasonable.”134
Eventually, the Eleventh Circuit determined that undermining the
employer’s “best-qualified hiring or transfer policy” would impose a
substantial hardship.135
D.

Fourth Circuit

The Fourth Circuit recently decided Elledge v. Lowe’s Home
Ctrs., LLC.136 In this case, Chuck Elledge began working for Lowe’s
in 1993.137 Over the course of his employment, Elledge was
promoted multiple times, ultimately becoming a Market Director of
Stores.138 This position required Elledge to oversee dozens of stores,
which performed well under his supervision. 139
In 2014, Elledge had knee replacement surgery on his right
140
knee.
He was eventually cleared to return to work but with
restrictions.141 Lowe’s complied with the doctor’s restrictions and,
for a time, allowed Elledge to modify the time he spent walking
through the stores.142 After renewing his accommodations, Lowe’s

Id. (“The ADA does not say or imply that reassignment is always reasonable. To
the contrary, the use of the word “may” implies just the opposite: that reassignment
will be reasonable in some circumstances but not in others.”).
131
See U.S. Airways, Inc. v Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002).
132
St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1346 (discussing the Barnett framework.); see
supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
133
St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1346.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
979 F.3d 1004 (4th Cir. 2020).
137
Id. at 1007.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 1008.
142
Id.
130
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learned that Elledge would be issued a permanent disability parking
placard.143 Upon hearing this, Lowe’s contacted Elledge’s doctor and
learned that Elledge’s restrictions would become permanent. 144 Once
this information was confirmed, the Regional Human Resources
Director voiced her concerns regarding Elledge’s permanent medical
restrictions.145
Eventually, Elledge was told he would no longer be able to
remain the Market Director of Stores.146 Elledge applied for two
director-level positions but was rejected for both under Lowe’s
succession planning policy. 147 Eventually, Elledge accepted early
retirement with a severance package, but later sued claiming ADA
violations.148
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by
determining that Elledge was not able to fulfill the essential duties of
his current position.149 Elledge argued that even though he was
unable to perform the duties of his job, Lowe’s violated the ADA by
not reassigning him to a comparable vacant position.150 The Fourth
Circuit described reassignment as a balancing act between the rights
of the disabled employee, the employer, and other employees.151 The
court contended that de-emphasizing reassignment allows for a better
relationship between disabled and non-disabled employees.152 The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that reassignment would deplete workplace
morale if a disabled employee were to disrupt the expectations of
those employees who are not disabled. 153 The court analogized
Lowe’s merit-based advancement system to the seniority system
present in Barnett.154 The court concluded that Lowe’s practice of
consistently identifying and advancing employees, based on a
disability neutral merit system, fell within the same principles as the

143

Id.
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 1011.
150
Id. at 1013-14.
151
Id. at 1014.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1015-16.
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automatic seniority-system in Barnett.155 Ultimately, the Fourth
Circuit decided that reassignment in violation of Lowe’s
advancement policies would not be reasonable. 156
V.

CIRCUITS THAT SUPPORT MANDATORY REASSIGNMENT TO
A VACANT POSITION
A.

Seventh Circuit
i. Pre Barnett Decision

The significance of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’
holding in EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc.,157 requires a discussion of
EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.158 In Humiston-Keeling, Nancy
Cook Houser was working in a pharmaceutical products warehouse
as a product picker. 159 Houser was involved in a work accident
which led to severe tennis elbow, diminishing her ability to lift items
with her right arm.160 The employer originally attempted to
accommodate Houser in her current warehouse position by “rigg[ing]
an apron” so she could continue to carry items to the conveyor with
her left arm.161 When this accommodation was unsuccessful, Houser
was reassigned to a temporary greeter position.162 Once the
temporary position ended, Houser applied for vacant clerical
positions within the company. 163 Although qualified, Houser was
passed over in favor of other applicants, and was eventually let go. 164
The Seventh Circuit Court rejected the EEOC’s position that
an employer is required to reassign a qualified disabled employee,
absent an undue hardship. 165 The court reasoned that the EEOC’s
interpretation would require “employers to give bonus points to

155

Id. at 1016.
Id.
157
693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012).
158
227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).
159
Id. at 1026.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 1026-27.
165
Id. at 1027.
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people with disabilities.”166 Further, the court rejected the EEOC’s
argument that if the reasonable accommodation merely allowed
Houser to compete, there would be nothing “left of the duty to
reassign a disabled worker.”167 The court asserted that plenty is left,
including the employer’s consideration regarding the feasibility of
assigning disabled workers to positions in which their disabilities
“will not be an impediment to full performance.”168 Once the
employer determines that reassignment is feasible, then the
reasonable accommodation is mandatory, as long as the employer is
not required “to turn away a superior applicant.” 169 Ultimately, the
Seventh Circuit held that “the ADA does not require an employer to
reassign a disabled employee to a job for which there is a better
applicant, provided it’s the employer’s consistent and honest policy
to hire the best applicant for the particular job in question rather than
the first qualified applicant.”170
ii. Post Barnett Decision
In EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc.,171 the EEOC urged the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to revise its interpretation of
reassignment as a reasonable accommodation. 172
The EEOC
contended that the holding in Barnett undermines the court’s
previous ruling in Humiston-Keeling.173 Further, the EEOC argued
that “the ADA requires employers to reassign employees, who will
lose their current positions due to disability, to a vacant position for
which they are qualified.”174
In this case, the EEOC sued United Airlines in district court,
alleging that the company’s reasonable accommodation guidelines
violated the ADA.175 The district court dismissed the case citing the
binding precedent in Humiston-Keeling, which held that a policy

166

Id.
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 1029.
171
673 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated 693 F.3d 760 (2012).
172
Id. at 543.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 543-44.
167
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requiring competition for a disabled employee requesting a
reasonable accommodation was not a violation of the ADA. 176
EEOC’s contention that the Barnett decision undermined HumistonKeeling, was also rejected by the district court. 177
Although the Seventh Circuit believed that the EEOC’s
interpretation of reassignment under the ADA “may in fact be more
supportable,” the court stated that overruling a prior decision is “no
easy task.”178 The court explained that the EEOC needed to provide
a “compelling reason to deviate from precedent,” by showing that the
court’s “established interpretation of the ADA in Humiston-Keeling
is no longer viable after Barnett.”179
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit decided that EEOC’s
arguments were not persuasive enough to show that the decision in
Humiston-Keeling was no longer good law.180 However, the court
did recommend “en banc consideration of the present case since the
logic of EEOC’s position . . . is persuasive with or without
consideration of Barnett.”181
In September of 2012, the Seventh Circuit decided that its
holding in Humiston-Keeling was no longer valid after Barnett.182
The court held “that the ADA does indeed mandate that an employer
appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they
are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be
ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that
employer.”183 The court continued by noting that a “best qualified
selection policy” is not similar to a “seniority system.” 184 The court
explained that “[w]hile employers may prefer to hire the best
qualified applicant, violation of a best-qualified selection policy”
does not create the same concerns and burdens as a violation of a
seniority system.185 Since the Supreme Court has held that
reassignment to a vacant position, absent an undue hardship, is

176

Id. at 544.
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 545-46.
180
Id. at 546.
181
Id. at 546-47.
182
EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012).
183
Id. at 761.
184
Id. at 764.
185
Id.
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reasonable, “an employer must implement such a reassignment
policy.”186
B.

Tenth Circuit

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc.187 that reassignment to a vacant position “must mean
something more than the mere opportunity to apply for a job with the
rest of the world.”188 In this case, Robert Smith worked in the light
assembly department for nearly seven years as a tester of valve
components for the air brakes of large vehicles. 189 During his
employment, Smith developed a chronic skin irritation and muscular
injuries from constant contact with chemicals. 190 Smith’s injuries
were so severe that his physicians restricted his work activities and
recommended that he avoid further exposure to irritants, and at times,
ordered him to abstain from work for limited periods.191 Smith
acknowledged that his physician considered him permanently
disabled and unfit to continue working in the assembly department. 192
Smith also contended that given his limitations, his employer was
incapable of finding him a position in his current department. 193
Midland Brake eventually fired Smith because it was unable to
accommodate him in the light assembly department. 194
Smith sued Midland Brake alleging that it failed to reasonably
accommodate him, but the District Court of Kansas entered summary
judgment for Midland Brake. 195 The District Court held that Smith
“was not a qualified individual with a disability” because he never
provided Midland Brake with a medical release which would allow
him to return to work. 196 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court’s judgment, concluding that “no amount of accommodation

186

Id.
180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
188
Id. at 1164.
189
Id. at 1160.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
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Id.
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could allow Smith to perform his existing job.” 197 The Tenth Circuit
agreed to rehear Smith’s ADA claim en banc. 198
The Tenth Circuit began with a detailed discussion regarding
the interpretation of the ADA’s requirements.199 The court discussed
the statutory framework of the ADA, noting that the threshold issue,
whether the employee is qualified, must be met.200 Midland Brake
argued that since Smith was unable to perform the essential function
of his existing job, he did not meet the definition of qualified. 201 The
court disagreed with Midland’s argument, determining that although
an individual must be able to “perform the essential function of a
job,” that does not mean only his existing job. 202 The ADA’s
language includes other jobs the disabled employee “desires” as long
as he or she is able to fulfill the duties required by the position,
otherwise the word is meaningless.203 The Tenth Circuit supported
this conclusion by examining the definition of reasonable
accommodation and suggesting that reassignment to a vacant
position, “includes a reassignment from the employee’s current job to
one that he or she desires.”204 Building on this reading of the ADA,
the court pointed to the House Committee on Education and Labor
report which stated that if a disabled employee can no longer perform
the essential functions of the job, “a transfer to another vacant job for
which the person is qualified may prevent the employee from being
out of work and [the] employer from losing a valuable worker.” 205
Further, the court determined that a qualified employee with a
disability is one who can perform the duties of “an appropriate
reassignment job within the company, with or without reasonable
accommodation, even though he or she cannot perform their existing
job no matter how much accommodation is extended.”206
197

Id.
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 1161.
201
Id. (“The ADA defines a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ as an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires.” (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1211(8)).
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 1162.
206
Id.
198

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/19

20

Ortiz-Tulla: Qualified Does Not Mean Over Qualified

2021 QUALIFIED DOES NOT MEAN OVER-QUALIFIED

1073

The court also addressed the argument in Judge Kelly’s
dissenting opinion.207 Judge Kelly suggested that the ADA only
grants the disabled employee equal consideration of their application
for the vacant position.208 The Tenth Circuit found this interpretation
too narrow since it would undermine the literal meaning of
reassignment and render the statutory language a “nullity.” 209 The
court reasoned that reassignment requires an employer to do
“something more” than merely allow a disabled employee the
opportunity to apply for a vacant position. 210 Additionally, the court
pointed out that the ADA already prohibits employers from
discriminating against disabled employees, whether they are an
outside applicant or one who is seeking reassignment.211 The Tenth
Circuit inferred that if reassignment merely meant that an employer is
required to consider an existing disabled employee alongside other
applicants, the language would be redundant since those protections
are already afforded in the application process. 212
Further, the court focused on the EEOC Interpretive Guidance
to show that merely considering a disabled employee’s application
for reassignment would amount to a “hollow promise” because the
right to ask for reassignment is not equal to “reassignment itself.” 213
If a disabled employee did not have the right to reassignment, but
only had the right to request a reassignment then the:
employer could merely go through the meaningless
process of consideration of a disabled employee's
application for reassignment and refuse it in every
instance. It would be cold comfort for a disabled
employee to know that his or her application was
“considered” but that he or she was nevertheless still
out of a job—a job to which he or she was otherwise
qualified and as to which he or she had a reasonable
claim to reassignment.214

207

Id. at 1164.
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 1164-65.
213
Id. at 1167.
214
Id. at 1167.
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Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit concluded that an employee is entitled
to reassignment to a vacant position as one of several reasonable
accommodations an employer must consider if a disabled employee
is unable to perform the essential duties of his or her position. 215
C.

District of Columbia Circuit

In Aka v. Washington Hospital Center,216 the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer is obligated
to do more than simply allow disabled employees to apply and
compete for a vacant position. 217 The court noted that the ADA’s
“reference to reassignment would be redundant if permission to apply
were all it meant.”218
Etim Aka worked as an operating room orderly at Washington
Hospital Center (WHC) for nineteen years before needing bypass
surgery.219 He spent several months in rehabilitation before receiving
permission from his doctor to return to work with a light to moderate
duty restriction.220 Aka asked WHC for a transfer to a compatible job
which adhered to his medical restrictions, but they refused to do
so.221 WHC insisted that Aka was responsible for searching the job
postings for vacant positions. 222 Aka applied for several positions,
but he was passed over for all of them. 223
Aka sued WHC alleging, among other things, a violation of
the ADA by failing to reassign him to a vacant position. 224 The
District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary
judgment for WHC, but a panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed and

215

Id.
156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
217
Id. 1305.
218
Id. at 1304.
219
Id. at 1286.
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remanded the reasonable accommodation claim. 225 WHC requested a
rehearing of the case en banc. 226
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis regarding Aka’s
reassignment claim by addressing whether he was “otherwise
qualified.”227 WHC claimed that since Aka was unable to perform
his duties as an orderly, the Hospital was not obligated to grant him a
reasonable accommodation. 228 The court indicated that WHC
misread the statute, determining that a disabled employee is entitled
to seek reassignment if he or she can perform the essential duties of
the desired job.229 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the EEOC
guidelines and the legislative history of the ADA “both support this
reading.”230 In the end, the court held that WHC is required to
reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability unless it can
demonstrate an undue hardship. 231
VI.

USING QUALIFICATION AS A PRETEXT FOR DISCRIMINATION

In general, discrimination against disabled individuals has
been well established in employment.232 Before the enactment of the
ADA, misconceptions about persons with disabilities was extremely
prevalent.233 This level of misunderstanding was brought to light
when “[e]very government and private study on the issue has shown
that employers disfavor hiring persons with disabilities.”234
A.

Qualified Means Qualified

The courts holding that reassignment should not be mandatory
are missing the point of a reasonable accommodation. These courts
are analyzing whether an employee should be given preference for a
position if he or she is not the most qualified. For example, the
225

Id.
Id. at 1288.
227
Id.
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Id.
229
Id. at 1301.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 1303.
232
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), supra note 21, at 28-29. (describing the
discrimination faced by individuals with disabilities).
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Id. at 71.
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Id. at 71.
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Eighth Circuit decided that Wal-Mart did not discriminate against
Huber when it declined her reasonable accommodation request. 235
The court’s position is that an employer is only required to provide an
accommodation that is reasonable and not an accommodation that the
employee perceives as ideal. 236 The court’s position minimizes
Huber’s claim because it suggests that this case is no more than a
squabble about an employee not receiving her first reassignment
choice, when in fact, it is much more than that.
Under the ADA, a qualified disabled employee is one who
has the requisite skill to perform the fundamental duties of the job he
or she holds or desires. 237 There is no mention of “superior
qualifications.” In fact, the EEOC’s formal regulations specifically
prohibit using qualification standards which may tend to exclude
individuals with disabilities. 238 Although the language here seems
quite plain, some law review authors postulate that being qualified
means something more in relation to the reasonable accommodation
of reassignment.239
In one article, a fictional employer has an opening for a typist,
where typing speed is an essential part of the position. 240 The
employer has stated that applicants must maintain a minimum typing
speed of fifty words-per-minute.241 The author then states that two
people apply for the position, one who types 120 words-per-minute,
with flawless accuracy, and one who is disabled typing fifty words
per minute, with just above average accuracy. 242 The hypothetical
goes on to say that although the one applicant is “more qualified,” the
position is given to the other applicant based solely on his
disability.243 The author makes sure to specify that the employer has
235

Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, 486 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2007).
Id. (referring to the holding of Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan.
City. 214 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2000)).
237
42 U.S.C. §12111(8).
238
29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (2011).
239
Taylor Brooke Concannon, Don’t Throw the Baby Out with the Bathwater:
Taking the Seventh Circuit’s Decision in EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc. Too Far
[693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012)], 52 WASHBURN L. J. 613, 613 (2013); Edward G.
Guedes, Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. – Writing Affirmative Action into the
Americans with Disabilities Act?, 73 Fla. B. J. 68, 69 (1999).
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
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Id.
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a “bona fide policy of hiring the most-qualified applicant for each
available position.”244
This hypothetical is misconstruing the meaning of qualified.
The ADA does not require a disabled individual to have superior
qualifications and flawless accuracy. As previously mentioned, the
ADA states that a disabled employee needs to be able to carry out the
duties of the job to which he or she wants to transfer.245 In an attempt
to highlight the inaccuracy of a superior qualification standard, the
Tenth Circuit states that an employer commits discrimination if it
fails to reasonably accommodate a qualified disabled person.246 The
court explains that if a reasonable accommodation cannot keep an
employee in an existing job, then reassignment may be necessary as
long as the job is vacant, the employee has the necessary
qualifications, and the reassignment does not create a burden to the
employer.247 Requiring anything more, such as demanding the
employee requesting reassignment “be the best qualified employee
for the vacant job, is judicial gloss unwarranted by the statutory
language or its legislative history.”248 Essentially, if an employee can
perform the duties outlined by an employer, then that employee is
qualified. Again, the Tenth Circuit explains:
We have no quarrel with the proposition that an
employer, when confronted with two initial job
applicants for a typing position, one of whom types 50
words a minute while the other types 75 words a
minute, may hire the person with the higher typing
speed, notwithstanding the fact that the slower typist
has a disability. However, the legislative history
clearly distinguishes between the affirmative action of
modifying the essential functions of a job (which is
not required) and the duty to reassign a disabled
person to an existing vacant job, if necessary, to
enable the disabled person to keep his or her
employment with the company (which is required). 249

244

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
246
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1169 (10th Cir. 1999).
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id. at 1168.
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This example provided by the court exemplifies the importance of
mandating the reassignment reasonable accommodation for disabled
employees. Without mandatory reassignment, disabled employees
are forced to compete for positions which they are already qualified
for.
No other reasonable accommodation requires the disabled
employee to compete for the privilege.250 An employee requesting a
talk-to-text headset as an accommodation does not have to compete
in order to stay in his or her current position.251 Unfortunately,
several misguided circuit courts are mandating competition for
disabled employees requesting a reassignment. 252
B. Some Preferences Are Needed Despite Disability
Neutral Rules
When read and interpreted carefully, the language of the ADA
already supports preferences and at times mandates employers to
depart from their neutral policies. For instance, Congress began by
prohibiting employers from using any standards or criteria that may
have an adverse effect on those with disabilities. 253 This mandatory
departure from an employer’s already established policies shows that
Congress intended extensive reforms in order to afford disabled
employees the same opportunities as their non-disabled counterparts.
Regrettably, some courts have misinterpreted the ADA’s
purpose and disabled employees are once again facing additional
obstacles. The Eleventh Circuit’s holding in St. Joseph’s Hospital,
Inc. is a good example of an unnecessary hurdle.254 As previously
discussed, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the ADA does not require
reassignment without competition for, or preferential treatment of,
the disabled.”255
Here, the court decided that it would be
unreasonable to require an employer to reassign a disabled employee
if it would violate the employer’s best-qualified transfer policy. 256

250

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), supra note 21 at, 33, 56, 63 (describing typical
accommodations which must be provided by employers).
252
See supra notes 8- 10, 14, and accompanying text.
253
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A).
254
EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. Inc., 842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016).
255
Id. at 1345.
256
Id. at 1346.
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The court mistakenly determined that the ADA only requires equal
opportunity and not preferential treatment. 257 This could not be
further from the truth.
Several of the reasonable accommodations listed already
require employers to provide preferences to disabled employees. 258
For example, employers may be required to modify work schedules,
restructure jobs, and adjust training protocols, violating their own
neutral policies in order to adhere to the ADA.259 Even the Supreme
Court stated in Barnett that “preferences will sometimes prove
necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal opportunity goal.” 260 The
Court further explained that contravening “an employer’s disabilityneutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation beyond the
Act’s potential reach.”261 In fact, the Court plainly stated that
permitting a disabled worker to violate rules that others must obey
does not automatically make an accommodation unreasonable. 262
C. Non-disabled Employees and Employers Already Have
Protections
Another major concern is that employers and non-disabled
employees will be unduly burdened or discriminated against if
reassignment were to become mandatory.263 This is the most
baseless concern of all. Employers and non-disabled employees
already have several protections including qualification standards, 264
undue hardships,265 and Barnett’s decision regarding seniority
systems.266 Of course, even with several protections in place, courts
continue to decide that reassignment requires competition. 267
In another law review author’s hypothetical, there is an
employee who during the course of his employment, suffers an
257

Id.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
259
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
260
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002).
261
Id. (explaining how neutral rules would restrict the reasonable accommodation
objective).
262
Id. at 398.
263
See supra Part IV.
264
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
265
See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
266
See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
267
See supra notes 8, 9, 10, 14, and accompanying text.
258
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accident that renders him disabled and incapable of performing the
essential functions of his position, with or without an
accommodation.268 There is a vacant position for which the disabled
employee is qualified but there is an applicant with more experience
who is also interested in the position. 269 The company would rather
hire the outside applicant but it reassigns the disabled employee
instead.270 Again, this author’s hypothetical involves a disabled
employee who is mediocre and only adequately performing. 271
Under the ADA, adequate and mediocre have no meaning in relation
to reassignment. A disabled employee is either qualified or not. 272
The ADA explicitly defines a qualified person with a
disability as one who can carry out the essential function of the
job.273 The phrase “essential functions” is included to solidify an
employers’ control over job requirements for disabled applicants and
employees.274 As long as the “essential functions” are not marginal,
the employer can use job descriptions as a method of weeding out
underperforming employees.275
Additionally, the ADA states “consideration shall be given to
the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential,
and if an employer has prepared a written description before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description
shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.”276
This gives employers the ability to produce meaningful job
descriptions which allow them to decide what functions are
necessary. Disabled employees should not be subjected to a
“superior qualification” standard as a means for employers to
disqualify them from access to a reasonable accommodation.
As an additional safeguard, employers may show that a
reasonable accommodation request would cause an undue

Edward G. Guedes, Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. – Writing Affirmative Action
into the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 73 Fla. B. J. 68, 69 (1999).
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
273
Id.
274
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), supra note 21, at 55.
275
Id.
276
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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hardship.277 For example, in Daugherty, the case involves an
established seniority system which, if violated, would cause an undue
hardship for the employer.278 As discussed above, vacant positions
were filled by full-time employees before being offered to part-time
employees.279 The Fifth Circuit held that the ADA does not require
an employer to give a disabled employee priority in reassignment
over a non-disabled employee. 280 The court found that Daugherty’s
claim failed because he was not “treated differently from any other
part-time employee whose job was eliminated.” 281 Although the
court was correct, at the time, in deciding that Daugherty’s claim
should fail, the court should have focused on the undue hardship to
the employer.282 Instead, the court included additional unnecessary
commentary claiming that the ADA does not require affirmative
action for the disabled employee.283
Lastly, the Barnett two-part test helps employers who have
legitimate, non-discriminatory, seniority systems. 284 The Barnett
decision makes a disabled employee’s reassignment request
unreasonable if the employer has a legitimate seniority system in
place.285 This shifts the burden to the disabled employee, who must
now prove that the reassignment request was reasonable. 286 Only if
the disabled employee was successful, would the burden then shift
back to the employer to show that the request would cause an undue
hardship.287 This would effectively provide another safeguard for
employers faced with reasonable accommodation requests.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As outlined above, it is clear the ADA was enacted to place
disabled employees on a level playing field. 288 The ADA is not
277

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995).
279
Id. at 699.
280
Id. at 700.
281
Id.
282
Id. at 699.
283
Id. at 700.
284
See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
285
See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
286
See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
287
See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
288
See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
278
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meant to undermine an employer’s right to “choose and maintain
qualified workers.”289 The statute provides employers with guidance
in order to end discrimination against disabled individuals.290
Reassignment to a vacant position is called the
accommodation of last resort for a reason.291 At the point of a
request for reassignment, the disabled worker and the employer
would have already explored other forms of reasonable
accommodations292 and come to the conclusion that they were not
feasible. Requiring an employee who is already disabled to compete
for the ability to have an accommodation goes against the plain
meaning of the statute. No other reasonable accommodation requires
the employee to compete, but without some clear direction disabled
employees in many regions are required to compete in order to retain
employment.
Without mandatory reassignment to a vacant position, the
disabled worker will no longer be on a level playing field. In a postBarnett293 world, the federal circuit courts should take note of EEOC
v. United Airlines, Inc., and follow the Seventh Circuits guidance. 294
A most-qualified hiring and transfer policy should not surpass a
request for reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, unless the
employer can show an undue hardship.295 Disabled individuals have
enough to worry about. They should not have to worry about
inconsistent interpretations of the ADA working against them.
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